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NOTES
The Appealability of Federal Court Orders Denying
Stays in Deference to Concurrent State Court
Proceedings
When Congress conferred non-exclusive subject matter jurisdiction upon
the federal trial courts, it created the potential for simultaneous resort to state
and federal courts by parties to a single dispute.' The Supreme Court has
consistently affirmed the principle that pendency of an action in state court
is not a jurisdictional impediment to instituting a suit on the same cause of
action in a federal court, 2 provided that one or both of the actions are in
personam.3 Yet it is equally well established that federal trial courts are no
longer under an absolute obligation to exercise jurisdiction' and may stay
federal proceedings when the controversy may be settled more expeditiously
in state court.' Since the inception of the stay,' the decision whether any particular action should be stayed has been committed to the district court's
discretion. 7
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,8 the
Supreme Court established parameters on a district court's power to stay
federal proceedings pending state court actions, noting federal courts have
a "virtually unflagging obligation .. .to exercise the jurisdiction given to
them." 9 Yet in "exceptional circumstances," reasons of "wise judicial administration" do permit staying federal proceedings due to the presence of
concurrent litigation in a state court.II Although ColoradoRiver can be viewed
1. The most apparent example of non-exclusive subject matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction, enacted by Congress in 1789. See Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Co., 686
F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1983) (Doyle, J., dissenting). The majority of the cases which come
before federal courts are of a type over which the federal and state courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction. See generally Note, Stays of FederaLProceedingsin Deference to ConcurrentlyPending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 684 (1960).
2. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
3. When both actions are in rem or quasi in rem, the rule is well established that the court
first perfecting jurisdiction over the property may exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the other. See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939); United States v. Klein, 303
U.S. 276 (1938).
4. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
5. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1978).
6. See generally Note, Appellate Review of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 518, 518-25, (1972) (historical development of the stay order).
7. Calvert Fire, 437 U.S. at 664.
8. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
9. Id. at 817. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed use of the "exceptional circumstances" test articulated in ColoradoRiver in Moses H. Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.,
103 S.Ct. 927 (1983).
10. 424 U.S. at 818. Although the technical issue in Colorado River focused on dismissals
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as significantly limiting the situation where a stay may be appropriate, the

Court subsequently indicated in Will v. Calvert FireIns. Co." that Colorado
River "in no way undermined the conclusion ...

that the decision whether

to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court is,2in the last analysis,
a matter committed to the district court's discretion."'
Microsoftware Computer Systems, Inc. v. Ontel Co.," a recent Seventh
Circuit case, substantially extended the inquiry into the discretionary power

of a district court to grant or refuse stays. At issue was whether a federal
district court is ever required to stay federal proceedings pending concurrent

state court litigation. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the case was one of
"first impression," held that the trial court's refusal to stay constituted an
abuse of discretion.'" Ontel has been described as one of the most significant
decisions of a United States court of appeals in the last decade.' 5 This decision, if followed in other circuits and maintained in the Seventh Circuit,' 6
creates a new limitation on the power of the national courts, indicating a
substantial change in the distribution of power between the federal and state
court systems.'"
This Note examines the appealability of orders refusing to stay federal pro-

ceedings in deference to concurrent state court proceedings. Consideration
is first given to the circumstances in which federal stays are proper. Included in this discussion is an evaluation of the Ontel holding. Attention
is then directed to statutory mechanisms affording appellate jurisdiction.
Specifically, analysis focuses on whether orders denying stays may be appealed
of right, either as denials of injunctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) or as
final decisions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or whether such orders
may receive discretionary review, either by certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) or by a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). This Note
concludes that these statutory provisions generally do not provide, and should

not be expanded to provide, review of orders refusing to stay federal proceedings in deference to concurrent state court litigation.
rather than stays, the court subsequently indicated that the principles articulated in Colorado
River are equally applicable to stays. See Calvert Fire, 437 U.S. at 672 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11. 437 U.S. 655 (1978). The Court subsequently stressed that Calvert Fire did not undermine the importance of the exceptional circumstances test articulated in ColoradoRiver. Justice
Blackmun, although concurring in the judgment in Calvert Fire agreed with the four dissenting
justices to form a majority opinion that requires application of the Colorado River test. Mercury
Const., 103 S. Ct. at 937-38.
12. 437 U.S. at 664.
13. 686 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 538.
15. Comment, Federal Court Stays ProceedingsPending Resolution of State Court Suit, TRIAL
LAW. GUIDE 455 (1982).
16. The Ontel decision has been cited at least three times with apparent approval. See Evans
Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1982); Voktas, Inc. v. Cent. Soya
Int'l, Inc., 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982); Architectural Floor Prods. Co. v. Don Brann & Assocs.,
Inc., No. 81-5515, slip op. (N.D. Ill. October 26, 1982).
17. Jeffery Shaman, Professor of Law at DePaul University, views the Ontel ruling as "part
of a trend to channel cases from the federal courts to state courts," supra note 15, at 457.
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DENIALS OF STAY
THE PROPRIETY OF FEDERAL STAYS

The "Exceptional Circumstances" Test
In ColoradoRiver, the Supreme Court addressed the circumstances in which
it is appropriate for a federal district court to stay a proceeding before it
in deference to a parallel state court proceeding. The Court explained that
in situations where jurisdiction is concurrent in two or more federal courts,
the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation. Is Where the action
paralleling a federal suit is in a state court, however, the district court's power
to dismiss the federal suit is limited by the "virtually unflagging obligation"
of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them. 19 The circumstances
that justify federal court inaction in deference to a state proceeding must be
"exceptional." 20
The Court declined to prescribe a hard and fast rule for dismissal of the
type in ColoradoRiver, but instead described factors relevant to the decision.
Specifically, the Court mentioned the inconvenience of the federal forum, the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the priority of jurisdiction
in the concurrent forums. The Court stressed that no one factor was necessarily
determinative and that "only the clearest of justification will warrant
dismissal."' Justice Brennan's opinion in CalvertFire attempts to clarify the
situations in which a stay of federal proceedings in deference to concurrent
state action may be proper:
Just how "exceptional" such circumstances must be was made clear by
our admonition that "the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal
suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of
wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than the cir-

cumstances appropriate for abstention." Since we had previously noted
that "abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under
[the abstention] doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the
order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest" . . . the circumstances warranting

dismissal "for reasons of wise judicial administration" must be rare
indeed.22

Evaluation of the Ontel Decision
The facts of Ontel do not distinguish it as a case so "exceptional" as to
justify the Seventh Circuit's holding that falling to stay the federal action
18. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817; Kerotest
Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952).
19. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
20. Id. at 818.
21. Id. at 818-19.
22. Calvert Fire, 437 U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting); See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4247 (1978 & Supp. 1982); 1A J. MOORE,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.203[4] [2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1982).
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constituted an abuse of discretion. Ontel, a New York corporation, delivered
certain goods to MCS, an Illinois corporation, pursuant to contractual agreement. Ontel brought an action against MCS in New York state court, alleging MCS repudiated by failing to complete the prescribed payments.2 3 MCS
refused to answer in state court, contesting the service of process. Instead,
it instituted a separate proceeding against Ontel in federal district court
in Illinois. Each of MCS's federal court claims arose out of the sale of goods
which was the subject of the state court proceedings.24
Approximately one month subsequent to the filing of the federal suit, Ontel
filed a motion with the district court to stay the federal proceedings pending
resolution of the state court litigation. At the time the motion was considered,
MCS had still not answered in state court. The district judge denied the
motion to stay. While noting that the two actions were "substantially identical," he found insufficient reason to shirk a district court's obligation to
25
exercise jurisdiction.
In reversing the district court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over MCS's
complaint, the Seventh Circuit recited three main considerations which purportedly required that the proceedings be stayed. These considerations included
the lack of an identifiable federal interest in trying the case, 26 the fact that
the state court first perfected jurisdiction over the dispute, 27 and the judicial

diseconomy inherent in duplicative law suits.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that these considerations mandated that
the federal suit be stayed is inconsistent with the "exceptional circumstances"
test articulated by the Supreme Court in Colorado River. In ColoradoRiver,
the decisive factor in favor of staying the concurrent federal proceedings was
"the clear federal policy" evinced by the McCarran Amendment of "avoid[ing]
the piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system ...a policy that
recognizes the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication
23. Pursuant to the contract between the parties, any dispute which arose was to be settled
using New York state law. See Ontel, 686 F.2d at 533.
24. In its federal complaint, MCS alleged breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraudulent
misrepresentations, and violation of the Illinois Fraud and Deceptive Consumer Practices Act
(ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 261 (Smith-Hurd 1960)).
25. 686 F.2d at 533.
26. The basis of the Seventh Circuit's contention that there was no federal interest in trying
the case was that MCS could have removed the state action had they been concerned with prejudice. This view ignores the facts of the case. In determining the propriety of a stay, the appellate court must view the facts as they were at the time the stay motion was made. Evans,
693 F.2d at 718. In Ontel, at the time the stay motion was made, MCS's ability to remove the
state suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 had expired. There is no precedent for the contention
that a litigant must attempt to remove a suit before he may institute a separate action in federal
court. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has upheld the principle that a suit may proceed
simultaneously in state and federal court. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
27. The Seventh Circuit subsequently indicated that this factor has little substantive significance.
See Evans, 693 F.2d at 718. In commenting on the priority issue, the Supreme Court in Mercury
Const. stated that the focus should not center on which complaint was filed first, but rather
on the relative progress in each action. 103 S.Ct. at 940.
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'
No comparable federal
of water rights as the means for achieving this goal." 28
policy favoring unitary state adjudication existed in Ontel. The lack of a particular federal interest in trying a case is clearly distinguishable from a strong
federal policy favoring a stay.
If Ontel is an example of circumstances sufficient to stay federal proceedings,
it could be argued that a stay is proper whenever federal jurisdiction is based
on diversity. Although diversity jurisdiction has been criticized as being outmoded and financially burdensome,2 9 until Congress decides to alter or
eliminate this method of obtaining a federal forum, courts should not treat
the diversity litigant as a second class citizen.3 0
When a stay operates to deny a litigant a federal forum to which the jurisdictional statutes appear to entitle him, "it should not be granted unless there
are substantial reasons going beyond the interest in judicial economy...""
To require less would allow the federal suit to be stayed wherever there are
parallel suits. The values served by the jurisdiction of the national courts have
been thought so significant as "to render tolerable, not intolerable," occasional inefficiency. As Judge Doyle, dissenting in Ontel, lamented, "this
distinctly unexceptional case fails miserably as the occasion for the pronounce32
ment of a new limitation upon the power of the national courts."1
In addition to signaling a significant curtailment of federal jurisdiction, Ontel
also raises the threshold issue of whether appellate courts have jurisdiction
to question the propriety of a district court's decision to exercise jurisdiction
over a matter properly before it. The ensuing discussion suggests that generally
they do not.

DIRECT APPEAL OF RIGHT
Denial of Stay as a Refusal to Issue an Injunction: Section 1292(a)(1)
By virtue of section 1292(a)(1) of the Judicial Code,33 appellate courts have
jurisdiction over "interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting
...
or... refusing ... injunction." Case law suggests that denials of stays
28. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.
29. See generally Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 268 (1968).

30.
31.
32.
33.

See Evans, 693 F.2d at 717.
Id.
Ontel, 686 F.2d at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
Section 1292 provides:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . or of
the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-

tions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976).
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are not independently reviewable under this provision.3 1 Such orders, however,
potentially may be appealed as analogous to refusing an injunction under the
35
judicially created doctrine known as the Enelow-Ettelson rule.
For an appellate court to invoke the Enelow-Ettelson rule to obtain jurisdiction over an order denying a stay, two requirements must be satisfied. First,
the action in which the order was entered must be one which, prior to the
merger of law and equity, would have been at law.36 Second, the stay must
have been sought to allow the prior determination of an equitable defense
or counterclaim. 37 This latter prong of the Enelow-Ettelson rule is satisfied
where, prior to the merger of law and equity, the party asserting the defense
or counterclaim would have had to institute an independent action in a court
of equity.38 The explanation of these requirements is embodied with seemingly archaic pre-merger customs, 39 yet Enelow-Ettelson remains a viable doctrine of appellate jurisdiction.' When both of the requirements are satisfied,
the order denying a stay is appealable as analogous to a denial of an injunction by a court of equity to restrain proceedings in a separate action at law."
The historic analogy fails, however, if the principal suit is equitable in
character. An equity court would have merely entered an order governing
the sequence of trying the issues of a case. 2 Similarly, the historic analogy
fails if the matter sought for prior determination is legal in nature. A court
of law need not have enjoined itself, and could not have enjoined an equity
court, to secure the prior determination of legal issues. 3
The Ontel court acknowledged that Enelow-Ettleson was controlling on the
issue of appealability." The first requirement of Enelow-Ettelson was easily
34. See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976); Glen Oaks Utils.,
Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960).
35. Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus. Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
967 (1979); see generally Comment, Arbitration or Litigation? United States District Court Orders
Resolving the Issue Should Be Appealable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 338, 340-41
(1973) (discussion of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine and its development).
36. See, e.g., Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659 F.2d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1980).
37. Id.
38. MOORE, supra note 22, at 110.2013].
39. The distinction between law and equity embodied in the Enelow-Ettelson rule has been
the topic of vast criticism among the circuit courts. See, e.g., Hussain v. Bache & Co., 562
F.2d 1287, 1289 nn.l-3 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827
(5th Cir. 1972). At least one commentator has suggested that if the distinction were to be eliminated,
it would be best to deny appeals from all orders which directly govern the order of the trial,
whether as a matter internal to a single lawsuit or as a matter of relations between separate
tribunals. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 22, at § 3923; see also J.MooRE, supra note 22,
at 110.2013].
40. Mellon Bank, N. Am. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1981).
41. Jensenius v. Texaco, Inc., Marine Dept., 639 F.2d 1342, 1343-44 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981);
see, e.g., C. Itoh & Co., Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343-44 n.3; see, e.g.,
Great Am. Trading Corp. v. I.C.P. Cocoa,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348
U.S. 176 (1955); City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
43. Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343-44 n.3.
44. Ontel, 686 F.2d at 535.
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satisfied. The principal dispute essentially involved a breach of contract, an
action clearly legal in character. In finding the second requirement also
satisfied, however, the Ontel court significantly expanded the scope of the
review afforded by the rule. 45
The court's expansion of Enelow-Ettelson stems from the reasoning it
employed in concluding that Ontel sought the stay to allow prior determination of an equitable defense. Initially, the court correctly indicated that the
substantive basis for a stay is to avoid unnecessary and financially wasteful
duplication of law suits."6 The Supreme Court in Kerotest Manufacturing Co.
v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.4 7 commented that control of duplicative litigation is a matter of equitable discretion. Relying on Kerotest, the Ontel court
concluded that since the district court's decision to deny the stay was an exercise of equitable discretion, the second requirement of Enelow-Ettelson was
satisfied. On that basis, it assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. This result
is strikingly suspect in that Ontel did not even attempt to claim that it had
sought the stay to allow the prior determination of an equitable defense, but
merely to avoid additional expense."' The effect of the Ontel decision is virtually to abrogate the second requirement of the Enelow-Ettelson rule, making any grant or denial of a stay appealable where the action in which it is
entered is legal in nature.
In justifying its extension of appellate jurisdiction over the order denying
the stay, the court construed section 1292(a)(1) as being flexible enough to
allow review of orders which would be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. Such an expansive construction of section 1292(a)(1)
is unwarranted. Rather, the section was designed to have very narrow
application,49 consistent with the congressional policy against piecemeal
appeals.5 The Supreme Court has consistently held that for an interlocutory
45. The issue of § 1292(a)(1) review of an order denying a stay was also raised in Central

Soya Co. v. Voktas, 661 F.2d 78, 80 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981), but could not be decided because
defendants had not complied with the requisite notice of appeals provision.
46. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949). Another substantive reason often

given to justify stays is the impropriety of encouraging a "race for res judicata." See, e.g.,
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 202 (1959)(dissenting opinion); United

States v. Adamant Co., 197 F.2d 1, 12-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 903 (1952).
47. 342 U.S. 180 (1951). "Wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical
solution of such problems. The factors relevant to wise administration here are equitable in nature."
Id. at 183. In Kerotest the concurrent lawsuits were pending before two federal courts. The
Court subsequently indicated that the circumstances justifying stays pending concurrent state
litigation are substantially more limited. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
48. Ontel, 686 F.2d at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).

49. See Mellon Bank, 651 F.2d at 1249. See also U.S.M. Corp. v. G.K.N. Fasteners, Inc.,
574 F.2d 17, 22 (Ist Cir. 1978) ("The Enelow-Ettelson rule provides, in the form of a vestigial

holdover, an errant exception to the general requirement of finality. As an exception . . . it
is properly constricted to as narrow a compass as possible.").
50. Substantial concerns are embodied in the "final-judgment rule." Among these are the

conservation of judicial resources, see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120,
124 (1945); promotion of better informed decisions, see Bodinger, 348 U.S. at 180-91; and preser-

vation of the respect and integrity of federal trial courts, see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience
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order to be reviewable under section 1292(a)(1) a litigant must show not only
that the order appealed has the practical effect of granting or refusing to grant
an injunction,5 but also that it may have a "serious, perhaps irreparable
consequence." '
Analysis of court decisions prior to Ontel suggests that section 1292(a)(1)
should be applied with "an eye toward a finding of nonappealability."" To
minimize interlocutory appeals, appellate courts have scrutinized actions
stringently in determining whether they are legal or equitable in nature, resolv-

ing all fair doubt about the character of an action against the claim that it
is predominantly one at law.3 For example, in Schine v. Schine," plaintiff
brought suit for $15,000,000 in damages due to alleged fraud and for an accounting arising out of defendant's alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Defend-

ant sought interlocutory appeal under section 1292(a)(1) of the district court's
refusal to stay the action to allow prior determination of an equitable
counterclaim. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that since the claim for an accounting would have been cognizable
only in equity prior to the merger of law and equity, the entire suit was
equitable for purposes of appealability."
Similarly, appellate courts have strictly enforced the equitable defense requirement of the Enelow-Ettelson rule. In Jensenius v. Texaco, Inc. Marine

Dept.,56 a case very similar to Ontel, the district court stayed federal proceedings to permit resolution of a legal claim pending before a state court.
The Fifth Circuit held Enelow-Ettelson did not allow review of the order
because the stay was not sought to allow prior determination of an equitable
claim or defense.5 7 The Jensenius court commented:
Absent an equitable defense or counterclaim "to support the fiction that
the power of a court of equity has been invoked by a defendant to restrain
the prosecution of a suit at law against him, there is no basis for holding
of Appellate Courts, 41 MnN. L. REv. 751, 775 (1957). This last concern is particularly significant where the matter is committed to the broad discretion of the district courts.
51. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).
52. Mellon Bank, 651 F.2d at 1249.
53. Id.at 1248.
54. 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1966).
55. Id. at 687-88. See also Lee, 593 F.2d at 1269 (mixed claims are to be treated as equitable
unless the equitable relief sought is "incidental" or "clearly subordinate" to the legal claims);
Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1973) (mixed action deemed equitable
if "it cannot fairly be said that either the legal or the equitable aspects predominate"). Strictly
construing the legal character of a suit, however, is no longer permitted when the constitutional
right to a jury trial is in question. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon
Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). There is a solid basis for this anomaly. The
right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the seventh amendment and, as such, deserving of stringent
safeguards. See G.K.N. Fasteners, 574 F.2d at 22.
56. 639 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 1343; see also United States v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 562 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir.
1977); Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1976); Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467
F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1972).
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that the stay order . . . was equivalent to an injunction and, as such,
appealable under § 1291(a)(1). ' 'ss

Had the expansive reasoning articulated in the Ontel decision been applied
in Jensenius, the order would have been appealable merely because the principal action was legal in character.
The Supreme Court, although it has never spoken directly on the applicability
of section 1292(a)(1) to orders denying stays pending concurrent state court
proceedings, has warned against Ontel-type expansion of the Enelow-Ettelson
rule. Chief Justice Hughes' landmark opinion in Enelow v. New York Life
Ins. Co.10 specifically distinguished ordinary denials of stays, which are not
reviewable, from those which are analogous to refusing an injunction.
This § 129 [predecessor to § 1292(a)(1)] contemplates interlocutory orders
or decrees which constitute an exercise of equitable jurisdiction in grant-

ing or refusing an injunction, as distinguished from a mere stay of proceedings which a court of law, as well as a court of equity, may grant
in a cause pending before it by virtue of its inherent power to control
the progress of the cause so as to maintain the orderly processes of justice. 60

Subsequent to the Enelow decision, the Court acknowledged the needless
reliance on pre-merger procedural differentiations embodied in the EnelowEttelson rule, yet indicated that the rule should not be modified by federal
courts.
The reliance on the analogy of equity power to enjoin proceedings in other
courts has elements of fiction in this day of one form of action ...

The distinction has been applied for years, however, and we conclude that
it is betterjudicialpractice to follow theprecedents which limit appealability
of interlocutory orders, leaving Congress to make such amendments as
it may find proper."

In expanding the type of decision afforded review under the Enelow-Ettelson
rule, the Ontel court compromised its authority to authorize appeals. The
approach taken in Ontel sets dangerous precedent for expanding interlocutory
reviews, in direct conflict with the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals and specific Supreme Court mandate. 62 Many interlocutory orders are
equally important as orders denying stays and may determine the outcome
of the litigation, but they are not for that reason converted
into grants or
63
denials of injunctions for purposes of appealability.
58. Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 846
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 936 (1962)).
59. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
60. Id. at 381-82. The point was made in Enelow that the power to stay mere steps within
the framework of the litigation before a court differs as to appealability from an injunction
prohibiting proceedings in another court. This distinction was applied in Morgantown v. Royal
Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1948).
61. Bodinger, 348 U.S. at 184-85 (emphasis added).
62. See id. (courts should not compromise their authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction
merely to simplify litigation).
63. The Court employed this same analysis to refuse interlocutory appeal of an order striking
a jury demand in Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. at 258.
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"Effective Finality" of Orders Denying Stays: Section 1291
An alternative statutory mechanism for direct appeal of right is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291,4 which provides for appeal of final decisions. Embodied in section
1291 is the str6ng congressional policy against "piecemeal appeals. ' 65 Concern for conserving judicial resources and minimizing the significant delays
caused by interlocutory appeals provoked the Supreme Court in Catlin v.
United States" to define final decisions, within the meaning of section 1291,
as those which "end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment. 6' 7 At first blush, it appears obvious
that trial court orders denying stays are not final decisions in the sense of
"ending the litigation." To the contrary, the denial of a stay often signals
parties to commence litigation in the federal courts. This has lured some courts
into summarily dismissing section 1291 review of orders denying stays. 6 Such
a cursory disposition of the appealability issue, however, even if correct, is
unjustifiable. Many apparent interlocutory decisions have been deemed to be
"effectively final" under a doctrine known as the "collateral order" rule,
first articulated by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan
Corp.69

Cohen, a diversity suit, involved an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion to require plaintiffs to post bond for payment of expenses incurred in defense of a stockholder's derivative suit, as required by a statute
of the forum state. The Court's opinion began by emphasizing that there can
be no appeal before final judgment "even from fully consummated decisions,
where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge. '"70
Yet the Court found the decision by the trial court not to require security
immediately appealable, noting:
[t]his decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole
case is adjudicated.'

Four requisites of appealability can be distilled from the above passage and
other language in the Cohen opinion. For an order to be within the "small
class" of decisions excepted from the final judgment rule, it must resolve
64. Section 1291 provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
65. See supra note 50.
66. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
67. Id. at 233.

68. See, e.g., Jensenius,639 F.2d at 1343; Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. Brinkle, 475 F.2d
1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
70. Id. at 546.
71. Id.
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a question completely separate from the merits of the action, conclusively
from
determine the disputed question, be effectively unreviewable on appeal
72
a final judgment, and involve a question of public importance.
Analogizing from Cohen, courts have held a host of judgments appealable
that are nominally interlocutory.7 3 Whether denials of stays pending state court
proceedings are appealable under Cohen is still an unsettled question. Justice
Black, dissenting in Baltimore Contractors,Inc., v. Bodinger," concluded that
an order denying a stay pending arbitration was within the exception to finality
carved out by Cohen." Additionally, several circuits have held that stay orders
are appealable as final decisions under section 1291 .76 A strong argument can
be made, however, that orders denying stays in deference to concurrent state
court proceedings do not meet two of the Cohen criteria."
It is unclear how a denial of a stay could satisfy the "importance" requisite
of the collateral-order rule. The Cohen opinion indicated that to satisfy this
requirement the order must involve a "serious and unsettled question,"" not
merely a question of the proper exercise of trial court discretion. An order
denying a stay clearly falls into the latter category. The factual situations out
of which stay motions arise tend to be individualized and complex, and the
trial court has been granted broad discretion in determining the propriety of
a stay in any particular situation. 79
Although the public importance element has been criticized as not being
an analytically proper component of the collateral order test,"0 and although
the Supreme Court has apparently never rejected an appeal for failure to satisfy
it, 8 the Court has continued to include it in its statement of the Cohen
doctrine. 82 Strong policy considerations suggest that this criterion should be
given substantive significance. Requiring that an order be of public significance
to be appealable under Cohen accords a reasonable division of duties between
trial and appellate courts. In making factual judgments or in applying general
legal standards to particular fact situations, the trial court's judgment should
rarely be disturbed. Only where a legal issue of general applicability is concerned is the appellate court arguably more competent.8 3 By affording the
72. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374-75 (1981).
73. See generally C. WVIGHT, supra note 22, at § 3911.
74. 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
75. Id. at 185-86 (Black, J., dissenting).
76. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently held that
a stay is appealable under § 1291 in Moses H. Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 103 S.
Ct. 927 (1983).
77. Two of the Cohen criteria are satisfied by orders denying stays pending state proceedings.
First, such orders are collateral to the merits of the litigation. Second, such orders are not effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Ontel, 686 F.2d at 534.
78. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547; see also In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 112 (Ist Cir.
1981); United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d 1211, 1213 (1st Cir. 1979).
79. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
80. See In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1980).
81. Id. at 7.
82. See, e.g., Firestone, 449 U.S. at 374-75.
83. See Wright, supra note 50, at 775.
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public importance element of Cohen practical significance, the division of duties
reflected in the "clearly erroneous" and "incorrect" standards of review would
also be reflected in the standards for direct appealability.
There is also serious doubt that a denial of a stay "conclusively determines
the disputed question" within the meaning of Cohen. The critical inquiry in
this regard concerns the trial court's ability to reconsider the decision denying
the stay as the trial progresses. Justice Jackson stressed in Cohen that the
order before the Court was a "final disposition of a claimed right" and
specifically distinguished cases in which the question was "subject to reconsideration from time to time." ' Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however,
suggest that this distinction is not as dispositive as it may first appear.
In Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp,8 5 the Court provided that in determining
the question of finality the most important consideration is the "danger of
denying justice" by delaying appellate review.16 A detailed reading of the Cohen
opinion indicates that this same concern was an important factor in the Court's
decision to grant appellate review." Together, Cohen and Gillespie may be
analyzed as creating a continuum: as the risk increases that an order may
cause serious, perhaps irreparable harm, the Court is more willing to sanction a pragmatic approach to finality, dispensing with the "technical" impediments to appellate review. This construction would allow appellate courts
to balance the effect of an order in a particular proceeding, freeing them from
the constrictions imposed by the technical possibility that the order may subsequently be modified at the trial court level.
A trilogy of recent Supreme Court opinions supports this construction of
the finality requirement. In United States v. MacDonald,88 a criminal defendant sought appellate review of a denial of a pre-trial motion to dismiss a murder
indictment due to alleged violation of the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial. The court of appeals reversed the district court order and remanded
the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment. Because of the importance of the jurisdictional question embodied in MacDonald, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The Court noted that it frequently had considered the appealability of pretrial orders in criminal cases, twice departing from the general prohibition
against piecemeal appellate reviews.8 9 In both cases in which the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction, it relied on the collateral-order exception articulated
in Cohen.9"
In reversing the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, the Court intimated that
84. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47.
85. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
86. Id. at 152-53 (the Court indicated that this factor should be balanced against the cost
and inconvenience of piecemeal review).
87. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
88. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
89. Id. at 853.
90. Id.
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denying immediate appellate review of the order did not create a substantial
risk of denying justice. The resolution of the speedy trial claim necessitated
a careful assessment of the particular facts of the case and therefore could
best be considered after the relevant facts had been produced at trial." On
that basis, the Court concluded that since the motion could be reconsidered
by the trial court
at a later point in the proceedings, the original order should
92
be reinstated.
The same basic balancing approach was employed by the Court in Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay.93 In Livesay, plaintiffs who had purchased securities
in reliance on a prospectus instituted an action on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated purchasers, alleging defendants had violated federal
securities laws. The district court first certified, and then after further proceedings, decertified the class.
Plaintiffs sought immediate review of the decertification order, filing a notice
of appeals pursuant to section 1291. The Eighth Circuit exercised jurisdiction
under the collateral order exception and reversed the adverse class determination on the grounds that plaintiffs may have found it economically imprudent to pursue the lawsuit to final judgment and then seek appellate review
of the class decertification."
In reversing the court of appeals, the Court relied, in part, on the power
of the district court to reconsider and modify the class decertification. 9 The
Livesay decision is significant in that it suggests the requisite risk of "denying
justice" sufficient to outweigh the technical infinality of a nominally interlocutory order. The Court distinguished the irreparable harm present in
Gillespie, finding it insignificant that the decertification order "may induce
a party to abandon his claim before final judgment." 96 The Livesay opinion
indicates that for an order to be appealable as conclusively determining a
claimed right it must impose a substantial legal impediment rather than a mere
economic disincentive. The Court intimated that to hold otherwise would infringe on "the appropriate relationship between the respective courts." 97
The next Supreme Court comment defining the collateral-order exception
is found in Justice Rhenquist's concurring opinion in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord.91 In Risjord, the court held that an order denying a mo91. Id. at 858-59.
92. Id. at 861.
93. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
94. Id. at 466-67.
95. Id. at 469. In subsequently discussing the Livesay decision, the Court cautioned that virtually all interlocutory orders may be altered or amended before final judgment; yet that does
not render all such orders "inherently tentative." The reasoning of the Livesay decision therefore
only reaches orders where some revision might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course
of litigation. Moses H. Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 103 S. Ct. 927, 935 n.14 (1983).
96. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 477.
97. Id. at 476. ("[A]ny such ad hoc decisions [extending appellate jurisdiction] disorganize
practice by encouraging attempts to secure or oppose appeals with a consequent waste of time
and money") (quoting Bodinger, 348 U.S. at 181-82).
98. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
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tion to disqualify opposing party's counsel in a civil case was not immediately appealable under the collateral-order exception. The majority based its
holding on the finding that the order was effectively reviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. 9 Justice Rehnquist, however, specifically focused on
the issue of whether the order denying disqualification of counsel "conclusively
determined the disputed question" within the meaning of Cohen. Relying
on the analysis employed in MacDonald and Risjord, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the question was not "conclusively determined" for purposes of
appealability."' The two considerations advanced to justify this conclusion
demonstrated a balancing approach consistent with Cohen and Gillispie. First,
the district court remained free to reconsider its decision at anytime during
the trial process. 10 Second, the denial of immediate review did not create
a substantial risk of irreparable harm."0 2 As in MacDonald, it could not be
assumed that the same motion would be denied if made at a later point in
the proceedings, when prejudice could better be assessed.
The pragmatic approach to finality, which emanates from the Supreme
Court's cumulative interpretation of the collateral-order exception, developed
concurrently in the circuit courts to extend appellate jurisdiction over order
granting stays. In Amdur v. Lizars,11 3 a forerunner among the cases adopting
this approach, the Fourth Circuit exercised jurisdiction over an appeal from
an order staying federal proceedings pending resolution of similar proceedings
in state court. Being careful not to encourage a multitude of appeals from
stay orders, the Amdur court indicated that only such orders that amount
to a dismissal of the proceedings are appealable. 4 The Fourth Circuit reiterated
that in the usual case, stay orders are not appealable but are "merely interlocutory orders stating what the court proposes to do which may be revoked or superseded at any time."'0 5 Subsequent circuit court decisions have
mirrored the distinctions established in Amdur10 6
Implicit in the distinction, for purposes of appealability, between ordinary
stays and those which are tantamount to dismissals, is that the latter present
99. Id. at 377-78.
100. Id. at 380-81 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 376.
103. 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967).
104. Id. at 106.
105. Id. at 105-06 (quoting International Nickel Co. v. Martin J. Barry, Inc., 204 F.2d 583,
585 (4th Cir. 1962)).
106. See, e.g., Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l., 659 F.2d 817, 818 (7th Cir. 1981)
("An order staying judicial proceedings . .. that ... does not result in a dismissal of the action
is not a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."); Drexler v. Southwest Dubois
School Corp., 504 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc) ("Technically this case was ... merely
stayed pending litigation in the state courts and it could be argued that the order is not appealable. However, we think it is only logical to consider this order a final judgment.") (emphasis added); see also Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21, 24 (9th Cir. 1973); Druker v. Sullivan,
458 F.2d 1272, 1274 n.3 (1st Cir. 1972). But see State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d
1151 (10th Cir. 1979) (stay pending state court proceedings held not appealable within § 1291
or Cohen).
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a risk of serious, perhaps irreparable harm sufficient to warrant immediate
review, notwithstanding that the order may be subsequently vacated by the
district court. Substantial federal policy concerns may justify this conclusion. 7
It is deeply embedded in American legal procedure that a party should have
the opportunity to pursue claims in the forum of its choice. 0 When that
choice includes a federal forum, it should be strongly protected. Considerations warranting such protection include shielding out-of-state litigants from
possible prejudice in state courts,' 0 9 securing the advantages of federal procedural rules, particularly the liberal discovery provisions, ' upholding the
federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction over
matters properly before them," and giving deference to the expertise of federal
courts, especially when an issue of national significance is involved."'
There is no comparable risk of "denying justice" where a trial court refuses
to stay federal proceedings in deference to state court proceedings which would
warrant immediate review under the collateral-order exception. In general,
there is no substantive protection from unnecessary litigation." 3 There are
a wide variety of situations in which a ruling on a preliminary matter would
determine whether or not the case is to continue; yet that does not make such
rulings final for purposes of appealability.' To rely on the hardship of being subjected to trial would abrogate the distinction between interlocutory and
final orders.' For this reason the Supreme Court has consistently held that
the hazard of being subjected to trial does not vest a preliminary ruling with
the finality requisite to appeal." 6 Analyzed in the context of the balancing
approach derived from Cohen and Gillespie, since no threat of serious harm
is created by a denial of a stay, the power of the district court to reevaluate
the order as the trial progresses precludes finding that the denial "conclusively determines the disputed question." This conclusion is not altered by
107. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (1976). These policy concerns
would satisfy the importance requirements in Cohen. See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
108. No court yet has indicated that the right to choose one's forum is any less substantial
where an action is already pending before a separate tribunal. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
109. See United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67 (1809).
110. Some courts have refused to stay federal actions to preserve the liberal federal discovery
rules. See, e.g., Nevy v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). Other courts have conditioned stays on the assent of the state courts to use the federal discovery provisions. See, e.g.,
Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
111. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
112. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 107, at §§ 17-20. The Supreme Court has upheld
the discretionary power of district courts to stay actions based on exclusive federal jurisdiction.
See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); see also Note, Jurisdiction-A Stay of
Federal Court ProceedingsInvolving an Issue Within Exclusive FederalJurisdiction, Pending
Termination of a ParallelState Court Action, is Justified When the FederalSuit is Found to
be Vexatious, 55 NoTma DA~m LAW. 601 (1980).
113. Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 717 (Ist Cir. 1977).
114. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 574 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. See id.; see also Lamphere, 553 F.2d at 717.
116. Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 574 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351
U.S. 513, 519-20 (1955).
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the possibility that the denial of the stay may be erroneous. The Supreme
Court in Risjord specifically warned against such expansion of finality.
Interlocutory orders are not appealable merely because they may be erroneous. To allow such wholesale appeals on that ground would not only
constitute an unjustified waste of scarce judicial resources but would
transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a broad disagreement of the finality rule imposed by congress in § 1291.'

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Permissive Appellate Review: Section 1292(b)
Some commentators have suggested" 8 that trial court orders denying stays
of federal proceedings pending concurrent state court litigation should be certifiable under section 1292(b).' ' 9 In Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya International,
Inc., 20 the Seventh Circuit accepted certification of such an order, yet did
so apparently on the assumption that orders denying stays were certifiable.' 2 '
Analysis of the language and spirit of section 1292(b), however, suggests that
such orders should not be permissively reviewed.
Congress enacted section 1292(b) in an effort to inject some flexibility into
the technical rules of sections 1291 and 1292(a).' 2 Section 1292(b) provides
interlocutory appeal of a carefully limited class of orders. The procedure for
obtaining permissive review involves two steps. First, the trial court must certify the question for appeal.' 23 Second, the court of appeals, in its unfettered
discretion, must decide whether it will permit appeal to be taken from the
order.' 24 For a particular order to be certifiable three criteria must be satisfied:
the order must involve a controlling question of law; there must exist a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and the order must be such that im117. Risjord, 449 U.S. at 378.
118. See, e.g., J. MooRE, supra note 22, at 110.20[4.-2]; C. WRuoIGr, supra note 22, at § 3923.
119. Section 1292(b) provides:
(b) When a district court judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order . . . Provided, however, That application for an appeal
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
120. 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 104 (the issue which the court discussed was whether a magistrate could certify
an order under § 1292(b), not whether such a order was certifiable).
122. C. WRIGHT, supra note 22, at § 3929.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
124. Id.
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mediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
proceedings.' 2 5
Consistent with the congressional policy against interlocutory appeals, the
House report on the bill' 26 and early court opinions indicated that permissive
appeals should be reserved for "exceptional cases.""'2 As the court in SevenUp Co. v. O-So Grape Co.' 28 noted:
There is nothing in the language of the statute or its legislative history
to support the view that Congress intended to establish something akin
to a "certiorari" policy for the court of appeals whereby important cases
would not receive special treatment. . . . The statute was not intended
to open the floodgates to a vast
29 number of appeals from interlocutory

orders in ordinary litigation.'
A strong argument can be made that trial court orders respecting a matter
entrusted to the trial court's discretion do not involve a "controlling question
of law" within the meaning of section 1292(b) and are therefore non-certifiable.
The basis of this argument is that in affording immediate review to controlling questions of law, section 1292(b) was not designed to substitute wholesale
appellate certainty for trial court uncertainty in situations where the trial court
is given broad discretion.' 30 This position is consistent with the statutory
language of the Act. When a trial judge has discretion to apply general legal
standards to complicated fact situations, questions of fact, not law, generally
predominate.' 3 '
Appellate courts have often accepted this construction of the statute in denying immediate review of discretionary orders. This is particularly well illustrated by opinions denying review of class certification orders. For example, in Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., the Third Circuit
refused to review a class certification of 300,000 claimants in an anti-injunction
action because such certification "was grounded in the discretionary power
of the district court.' 3 The court of appeals noted that the certification may
have had a very significant practical effect on the litigation and that the aggrieved party had a very real interest in securing immediate appellate review,
but it did not, for that reason, become a certifiable question.' 3 1 Similarly,
in Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 35 the Tenth Circuit denied
125. See, e.g., Central Soya Co. v. Voktas, Inc., 661 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1981).
126. H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); see also S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-4 reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7263.
127. See, e.g., Krauss v. Board of Co. Road Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1966); United
States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966).
128. 179 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Il. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1960).
129. Id. at 170-71.
130. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 862 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977).
131. See Ohio Envtl. Counsel v. United States Dist. Ct., S. Dist., 565 F.2d 393 (6th Cir.
1977); Bick v. Communications Workers of Am., 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979).
132. 550 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
133. Id. at 862.
134. Id. at 862-63.
135. 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973).
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section 1292(b) review of an order refusing to certify a class on the basis that
the order was within the sound discretion of the district court and therefore
should not be disturbed.' 3 6
Applying the analysis of Link and Wilcox to trial court decisions regarding
stays indicates that both orders granting and denying stays should be noncertifiable. It is well established that the decision to grant or deny a stay of
federal proceedings is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court. 37
Yet numerous cases have found orders granting stays certifiable under section 1292(b).' 38 Successful certification of such orders suggests three possible
conclusions. First, certification of the orders was erroneous; second, stay orders
are distinguishable from orders denying stays for purposes of permissive review;
or third, both orders are certifiable.
There is some authority for the argument that the decisions allowing section 1292(b) review of stay orders are erroneous. Some courts have limited
the definition of "controlling questions of law" to issues that may contribute
to the early determination of a wide spectrum of cases.' 3 9 The Supreme Court
arguably exempted from that category questions concerning the propriety of
stays by intimating that it is not possible to develop a universal rule for deter40
mining when a stay of proceedings is proper.'
The broad argument that stays are uncertifiable, however, is unnecessary
and, if possible, should be avoided due to the case support favoring certifiability of stay orders. The requirement that the question contributes to the early
determination of a wide spectrum of cases is not supported by the language
of the section or its legislative history.' 4 ' This is not to concede the appealability
of orders denying stays under section 1292(b). Detailed analysis permits resolution of the apparent discrepancy in a manner consistent with both Link and
Wilcox and the decisions that have held stay orders certifiable. To resolve
this inconsistency, it is necessary to distinguish, for purposes of appealability, orders that reflect a "conservative" exercise of discretion from those reflecting "liberal" exercise of discretion. There is a general presumption that federal
courts should exercise jurisdiction over cases properly before them.' 42 The
circumstances where it is proper to stay federal proceedings pending concur136. See also Hellenstein v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 531 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1976); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), But see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (accepted appeal of class certification order under § 1292(b)).
137. Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc. v. Ontel Co., 686 F.2d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1982).

138. See, e.g., P.P.G. Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973); Lear
Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964).
139. See, e.g., Kohn v. Royal, Koegel & Well, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1973).
140. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978); see also Ontel, 686 F.2d
at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
141. The Act makes no reference to the effect of the appeal on other cases. The certification

procedure was designed to facilitate the course of a particular litigation, rather than set precedent. See supra notes 119 & 126.

142. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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rent state court proceedings are rare. 1 3 Therefore, decisions denying stays
of federal proceedings represent a conservative exercise of trial court discretion, consistent with the court's "obligation" to exercise jurisdiction."', On
the other hand, decisions staying federal proceedings represent a liberal exercise of discretion and, due to the substantial interests in providing a federal
5
forum, require that some "exceptional circumstance" warrant the stay."1
This distinction is extremely significant to the issue of appealability under
section 1292(b). A prime factor in determining whether an order is reviewable
under this provision as involving a controlling question of law is the probability that the order will be reversed on appeal."' This reflects the intention
of the framers of the statute to avoid wasteful litigation."' 7 Since the decision
to grant or deny stays is committed to the discretion of the trial court, they
are reviewable only for abuse." 8 It is possible that a stay order, being a liberal
exercise of discretion, would be reversed on appeal; thus the stay order may
come with the provision of section 1292(b). It would be logically inconsistent,
however, to find that a decision by the district court to exercise jurisdiction
over a matter properly before it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 49 On the
contrary, such a decision is consistent with expressed Supreme Court mandate. Section 1292(b) is built on the presumption that a trial court will exercise discretion prudently. 5 ' Allowing interlocutory appeal would certainly be
more likely to lead to unproductive delay rather than the expeditious resolution of proceedings which the section was intended to promote. Therefore,
an order denying a stay of federal proceedings pending concurrent state court
action should not come within the scope of review extended by section 1292(b).
Empirically, discretionary orders which have been reviewed under this provision and subsequently were found to constitute an abuse of discretion support the distinction, for purposes of appealability, between conservative and
liberal exercise of discretion. Appellate courts have found abuse of discretion
in essentially two situations. The first is where the order violates expressed

143. Id.
144. This distinction was also articulated in Ontel. See Ontel, 686 F.2d at 542-43. (Doyle,
J., dissenting) ("[t]he question is whether the district court was free to exercise its discretion

in a conservative manner, to move in the mainstream, obedient
jurisdiction").
145. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.

. . .

to its obligation to exercise

146. See Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 26F. Supp. 704, 706 (D. Colo. 1966).
147. See Katz, 496 F.2d at 755.
148. Seven-Up Co. v. O-SO Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D. Ill. 1959) ("[t]he principle that an exercise of discretion by the trial court is reviewable only for abuse is . . . well-

founded in our jurisprudence").
149. See A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros. Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 442-43 (2d Cir. 1966) (where
district court considered the correct factors but reached on erroneous conclusion, § 1292(b) did

not provide a means of review); see also supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text. Even decisions to stay proceedings should not be reversed unless immoderate. In evaluating stay orders
appellate courts should consider the scope of the stay and the reasons recited by the district

court for the stay. See Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726, 733 (5th Cir. 1976).
150. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HtAv. L. REv. 351 (1961).
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federal statutes. For example, in In re VirginiaElectric & power Co.,, 1 the
Fourth Circuit accepted permissive appeal from an order by the district court
judge recusing himself and other Virginia judges. The court noted that ordinarily the decision of whether to sit or not sit in a particular action is within
the sound discretion of the trial court and as such not properly reviewable
under section 1292(b).152 The appellate court granted review in Virginia Electric, however, because the order directly violated the statutory mandate of
28 U.S.C. § 455 and indicated a complete failure
on the part of the district
3
court to exercise the discretion given to it.'1
The second situation where discretionary orders have been reversed as constituting abuse of discretion is where they have violated significant policy concerns embodied in federal statute. For example, in Mosely v. GeneralMotors
Corp.,54 the district court order severing action alleging race discrimination
in employment practices was held to constitute an abuse of discretion. Although
the decision to order separate actions was within the trial court's discretion
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(b), the appellate court justified
reversing the order on the substantial policies embodied in, and statutory intent of, allowing permissive joinder under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
20(a).' 5
Denials of stays do not invoke either of the risks highlighted in Virginia
Electric or Mosely. Rather, such orders are obedient to the district court's
presumptive obligation to exercise jurisdiction and secure the federal interests
in providing a forum for litigants. Section 1292(b) was enacted to reduce the
unnecessary waste of judicial resources. Allowing discretionary review of orders
denying stays would substantially undercut this goal.
Writ of Mandamus: Section 1651(a)
The final method of obtaining appellate review of interlocutory orders which
merits discussion is the writ of mandamus.'1 6 This is the only statutory
mechanism that potentially could provide appellate review of orders denying
stays without resorting to artifice or tortured language. Originally mandamus
was thought only to issue where the duty to be performed was ministerial
and the obligation to act peremptory and plainly defined.'"" It was thought
to be inappropriate to review decisions of district courts that were committed
151. 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976).
152. Id. at 363.
153. Id. at 363-64; see also Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.

1969).
154. 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974).
155. Id. at 1332-34.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) provides: "(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
157. Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1951).
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to their discretion." The writ was gradually extended, however, to include
cases in which the lower court had abused its discretion.'1 9
Some commentators' 60 and certain appellate court opinions 6 ' suggest that
mandamus will lie to review both grants and denials of stay motions. Such
a conclusion, however, is unjustifiably overexpansive. The cases in which such
statements were made and all the precedent upon which they are based, only
concern situations where stays were granted.' 62 The assumption that mandamus
should also lie where the stay was denied is obiter dictum and studied consideration of the statutory intent and judicial application of section 1651 suggest that it is erroneous.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the
traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction, both at common law and in the federal courts, has been to confine an inferior court
to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction 63or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.
To prevent excessive use of the provision, courts have established an extremely
strict standard of review, limiting it to circumstances constituting a clear and
indisputable judicial usurpation of power.' 64 Courts strictly prohibit use of
the writ as a substitute for appeal regardless of the hardship which may result
from delaying appellate review and a potentially unnecessary trial.' '6
The decisive issue in determining whether mandamus will lie where a trial
court refuses to stay federal proceedings pending state court litigation is whether
such a decision could amount to a clear and indisputable usurpation of power.
Because such a decision is committed to the trial courts discretion, it cannot66
be said that a litigant's right to a particular result is clear and indisputable."
This provoked the Supreme Court to state that such decisions ought not be
overridden by a writ of mandamus."17 Such an issue is not merely technical
since it raises grave questions of the continued strength of the salutary final
judgment rule and the propriety of appellate interference with the trial process at an early stage of the proceedings."'
158. Id. at 672.
159. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
160. See, e.g., J. MooRE, supra note 22, at 110.20[4.-2]; C. WRor, supra note 22, at § 3923.
161. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1979);
Pet Milk Co. v. Ritter, 323 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
162. See Lutes v. United States Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Okla., 306 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962). The Lutes case served as the basis of the Pet Milk court's
conclusion that writs of mandamus lie for both grants and denials of stays. Limiting Lutes to
its facts, however, only serves as precedent for the availability of mandamus where stays are granted.
163. Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953).
164. Will, 389 U.S. at 95; Moses H. Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr, 103 S. Ct. 927,
938 (1983).
165. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964).
166. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 (1978).
167. Id. at 665.
168. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1956) (mandamus may not be used to thwart
the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals).
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When a federal court refuses to stay its proceedings it acts in a manner
obedient to its virtually unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction over a
matter properly before it. Even should the decision not to stay proceedings
to await the determination of concurrent state action be erroneous, it would
not amount to a usurpation of power sufficient to invoke mandamus.'6 9 The
notion that a district court is without power to issue an erroneous order would
undermine the settled limitations upon the power of appellate courts to review
interlocutory orders.' ° "Certainly, Congress knew that some interlocutory
orders might be erroneous when it made them non-reviewable."''
As the
Supreme Court warned in Will v. United States, 72 "[c]ourts faced with the
preemptory writs must be careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled by
labels such as 'abuse of discretion'
appealable orders . . ..

. . .

into interlocutory review of non-

CONCLUSION

The present mechanisms which define appellate jurisdiction generally do
not afford immediate review of orders denying federal stays in deference to
concurrent state proceedings. This has preserved the respect and integrity of
district courts' authority to make decisions in matters committed to their broad
discretion. Appellate courts lack the intimate knowledge of docket pressures
and the nuances of particular cases which are crucial to a reasoned decision
of whether a federal suit should be stayed. Early review of such orders would
increase the risk of shortsighted decisions.
Circuit courts should not feel that reasons of judicial economy compel immediate review of orders denying stays. Questions of efficiency cannot be
viewed solely in the context of a single case. 7' As the Supreme Court indicated in Baltimore Contractors,Inc. v. Bodinger:'"5
When the pressure rises to a point that influences Congress, legislative
remedies are enacted. The Congress is in a position to weigh the competency interests of the dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of savings in time and expense, and to give proper
weight to the effect on litigants. When countervailing considerations arise,
interested parties and organizations become active in efforts to modify
the appellate jurisdiction. This [Supreme] Court, however, is not authorized
to approve or declare judicial modification. It is the responsibility of all
169. See, e.g., Parr,351 U.S. at 520; see also United States v. Dior, 671 F.2d 351, 357 (1982).
170. Will, 389 U.S. at 98 n.6.
171. DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 225 (1945).
172. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
173. Id. at 98 n.6.
174. "Unless we assume that district courts will err and err clearly, more often than not when
they deny stays, the aggregate effect of interlocutory appeals over the years will be to increase
...the demands upon federal appellate resources ....
Microsoftware Computer Sys., Inc.
v. Ontel Co., 686 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 1982) (Doyle, J., dissenting).
175. 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
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courts to see that no unauthorized extension or reduction of jurisdiction,
in the federal system . . . the choices fall in
direct or indirect, occurs
76
the legislative domain.'

Properly used, a stay can be an efficient tool in curbing protracted, expensive litigation. The motion to stay, however, can also be used as a litigation
weapon to preclude a litigant from trying a case before a federal court. A
stay, although not a formal renunciation of jurisdiction, typically does set
the stage for a later dismissal on a plea of res judicata." 7 Ironically, even
an order denying a stay could be used as a weapon to defeat federal court
jurisdiction if such orders were appealable immediately. The significant delays
inherent in the federal appellate court system often would work just as effectively as a stay in assuring the prior completion of concurrent state suits, even
where the appeal is taken on wholly spurious grounds. ' 7 Therefore, interlocutory review of orders denying stays is undesirable.

TRAcY THoMAs LARSEN

176. Id.at 181.
177. See, e.g., Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
178. The Third Circuit commented on the overcrowded appellate dockets in Link v. MercedesBenz of N. Am., noting that within the Third Circuit from 1969-1976 filings with the court
of appeals doubled while the number of judgeships remained the same. The Link court indicated
similar statistics were reported from the other circuits. See Link, 550 F.2d at 863 n.2.

